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To investigate the identity attributes of Turkish people living in France it is necessary to
consider ‘Turkish identity’, determine the stage of their identity building, and under-
stand the role religion plays in this quest for identity. Considering the complex structure
of Ottoman society and the multiple and dynamic properties of loyalty criteria, it is
difﬁcult to ascertain the deﬁnition of ‘Turkishness’ even in Turkey. It is probably not
necessary to explain that this is even more difﬁcult for Turks who are in the minority.
Turkish ‘Identity’
The education system in Turkey requires that all students learn an acceptable
deﬁnition of Turkish identity by heart through countless repetitions. Starting in pri-
mary school, Turkish students are given a ‘checklist:’1 one language, one religion, one
history, one ideal. The rigid implementation of these criteria of loyalty gives rise to a
variety of problems, which constitute a common problem for all Turks, whether
living in Turkey or abroad. One ﬁnal remark: the Turks in Europe implement these
criteria in a priority order from the most important to the least.
Turks in Europe cast aside the legal deﬁnition of ‘Turkishness’ and uphold its
cultural (meaning national, therefore subjective) attributes. Amongst the primary
reasons for this attitude is the fact that many of the ﬁve million people of Turkish
origin living in Europe have been naturalised in the host country. Meanwhile, even
the constitutional deﬁnition of Turkishness has been under debate in Turkey lately.
(Article 66: ‘Any citizen of the state of Turkey is a Turk.’) Individuals who have been
unable to adapt to the checklist mentioned above for any reason (for example,
because they had different demands or were excluded by the majority) have caused
the emergence of a new debate on supra-identities and sub-identities.2
The quest for identity by minorities is subject to setbacks: actions that are
considered ‘anti-minority’ are being condemned with greater fervour and the transfer
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of identity qualiﬁcations has become a matter of life and death. Groups who consider
themselves minorities – or under threat – interpret the loyalty criteria mentioned
above in complex, sometimes contradictory ways. On one hand, the group maintains
some ﬂexibility in the loyalty criteria to ﬁll their ranks and prove their weight before
the majority. For example, young generations who are not ﬂuent in their mother
tongues are tolerated and regarded as part of the minority. On the other hand,
requirements to comply with the behaviours that represent the identity of the majority
become stricter. Failure to remain within the strict codes of conduct leads to the
exclusion of the individual. Some acts which are more easily accepted in the majority
(such as marrying someone not belonging to the group) backﬁre in the case of
minorities. Such ‘house rules’ of minorities apply to the people of Turkish origin
living in France. With a population of almost 500,000, this group follows the
discussions within Turkey very closely. Nevertheless, they create their identity not
only by following the developments in Turkey, but also with the experience of being
in the minority. The criteria, which evoke the sentiment of loyalty to an ever-
restructuring group, cause the community to undergo continuous changes, and help it
to evolve from an imagined community into a group that needs to be fought for if it is
to survive.3 To achieve this, minorities naturally place great importance on loyalty
criteria and the transfer of the collective memory.4
People of Turkish origin in France devise two types of strategy: the ﬁrst is an
approach where radical religious acts and inter-communal marriages are supported
with an emphasis on the minority being ‘Turkish’ and on attempting to preserve this
characteristic at all costs. The indivisible unity of the community is paramount. The
second is an approach that – similar to the case in Turkey – springs from and is
propagated through differences among classes and groups, and results in religious
and ideological separations. The position of religion in these two strategies utilised by
the Turkish people in France to protect their identities will be discussed later; ﬁrst,
there is a need to study processes of religious structuring and the relations between
various modes of loyalties. Finally, the position of the Turkish community within the
Muslim community in France and its key differences can be highlighted.
People of Turkey in France: Identity Strategies
Due to differences between the French and Turkish deﬁnitions of ‘nation’ and
‘citizenship’, it is not possible to determine the exact population of the ‘Turkish’ com-
munity’ in France. The French census system has only two main categories: French
citizens and resident aliens.However, a subcategory lists ‘naturalised French citizens’ by
their ethnicity. The Turkish system is a mix of the French (jus soli) and German
(jus sanguini) systems, and apart from the non-Muslimminorities identiﬁed in the Treaty
of Lausanne, ignores the legal presence of minorities. The Turkish census continues the
Ottoman millet system in that it identiﬁes minorities by their religious afﬁliation.
Although the proclamation of the Republic meant that the Turkish state was restruc-
tured with the individual rather than the group at the forefront, the Ottoman reﬂex of
ethnic-religious classiﬁcation had been internalised by the people and the government.
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Any citizen of Turkey may be a Turk according to the constitution, but the criteria for
belonging in ‘Turkishness’ are relative from a cultural perspective.
Immigrants are subject to a redundant count by the Ministry of Labour and Social
Security of Turkey due to the obscure deﬁnition of ‘Turkishness’. The Ministry
includes Turkish nationals living in France and the French of Turkish origin
(regardless of whether dual nationality was obtained afterwards) in the Turkish
nation. The fact that France does not legally recognise dual nationality but does so in
practice, further complicates the issue.
There are three distinct types of Turkish populations in France: ‘French of Turkish
origin’, ‘alien Turkish nationals’ and ‘ethnic Turks’. This is why a census of the
‘Turkish population’ or ‘French population of Turkish origin’ yields different results
depending on the procedure used. A census based on the legal deﬁnition of groups
may be different from another based on ethnic, identity or cultural classiﬁcations.
French and Turkish statistics are widely different, and this sometimes sparks dis-
cussions which are far from objective (such as the xenophobic and/or nationalistic
discourses of the extreme rightists in Turkey and Europe).
The French population of Turkish origin consists of Turkish-born immigrants who
were naturalised by legal procedures, and persons born in Turkey from a parent who
is a French national. Upon closer scrutiny, the statuses of its members are:
∙ Turkish-born citizens of Turkey who reside in France and have gained
French citizenship by way of naturalisation, marriage or for having a
parent who is a French citizen;
∙ Children of Turkish parents who, being born in France, either gained
French citizenship at birth or applied for naturalisation (persons born
before the Pasqua Act gained citizenship automatically, and those born
after the Act can apply for naturalisation);
∙ Levantines, Armenians, Jews and other citizens of Turkey who are not
ethnic Turks may be naturalised in France or regain their French
citizenship (there is at least one French PrimeMinister and several French
deputies who have gone through this process).
Among the Turkish people in France are a small number of refugees (Turkish citizens
who sought and gained asylum) and stateless (political dissidents or military service
objectors who were expelled from citizenship by the government of Turkey). These
individuals are considered citizens of Turkey or without citizenship until their French
citizenship is granted.
Who are the Turks in France?
Perpetual First Generation Strategy
In the case of minorities, particularly the Turks, religious loyalty is considered the
guarantee and proof of national loyalty. The transfer of national identity, and con-
sequently that of religious identity, is directly correlated with the transfer of the
collective memory to new generations.
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The transfer of collective memory for the purposes of ensuring unity and integrity
rests on three identity pillars: the longing for and loyalty to ‘the Motherland’ (Turkey
in general, the hometown or village in particular); transfer of the Turkish language
to the younger generation despite French being the ofﬁcial language; and the
continuation of customs and traditions believed to be rooted in religion. The reason
the community is so fervently attached to these three topics is their desire that the
Turkish children born in France could share the same sentiment of ‘Turkishness’with
them. Various methods are employed by the community to transfer these three ele-
ments to new generations. The leading method has to be the perpetual ﬁrst generation
strategy. What is meant by this is the marriage of young French people of Turkish
descent to Turkish brides and grooms who preferably live in Turkey, and even more
preferably are brought to France for marriage from the region of the French family’s
hometown. In other words, young French people of Turkish origin rarely marry
people who are of French or other nationalities, and seldom marry other members of
the Franco-Turkish community. As a result, a second or third generation of ethnic
Turks has not arisen in France. From a statistical point of view, one of the parents
(usually the mother) of all Turkish (and Kurdish) children born in France is a new
arrival in France. The ‘fresh blood’ spouses are received as representatives of genuine
‘Turkishness’ (particularly in terms of language and religion) who will help to correct
the degeneration in the ‘Turkishness’ of ethnic Turks who have lived in France for
too long.
The loyalty to Turkey of the ethnic Turks in France is also shown by how they
call Turkey the ‘Motherland’. The pillars of identity building in the community are
language (Turkish and/or Kurdish) and religion (Sunni or Alevi). But the two pillars
need a hinterland. The hinterland is primarily Turkey, but expands to concentric
circles of the immigrant’s own home villages, towns and provinces. The ties with their
country are both physical and mental. Physical ties are the result of frequent travel to
Turkey, whether for business, school or leisure, following the developments in Turkey
via newspapers, television and other media, and contact with the country by phone or
the internet. These three methods of contact have developed signiﬁcantly in the last
two to three decades: ﬂights and trips between the two countries are frequent and
fares are low; the number of national and local television stations has boomed and
these stations may be received abroad; the internet provides a means to communicate
at minimal cost whilst phone tariffs are also going down. All of these enable the ethnic
Turks in France to keep in contact with Turkey. Interaction with Turkey is now
ubiquitous.
It is more difﬁcult to grasp the emotional or mental ties with Turkey. These ties are
probably correlated to two approaches:
∙ First, ethnic Turks in France are more interested in Turkish politics than
they are in French internal affairs. In fact, they pay close attention to the
political environment in Turkey, and want the political context in Turkey
either to change or remain as it is; much like their compatriots in Turkey.
From this perspective, the change in the discourse of French Turks
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regarding the accession of Turkey in the EU is noteworthy. Although they
desire Turkey and France to be members of the same union for emotional
and practical reasons, they too have begun to voice the anti-French and
anti-European discourse recently on the rise in Turkey. Meanwhile, none
of the Turkish associations or organisations in France have attempted to
block Turkey’s accession to the EU. They desire the membership of
Turkey for two somewhat irrational reasons: one is the desire for the
Turkish state to attain a better future and position. Second is their hope
that the accession of Turkey will legitimise their presence in France and
improve their image in the eyes of the French public. This attitude points
out that the people of Turkish origin have evolved into a ‘diaspora’ as
deﬁned by Kim Butler. According to Butler, members of the diaspora
continue to be interested in the politics of the root nation. The interest is
not necessarily in the way of support. On To the contrary, a section of the
diaspora may even side with the opposition. However, it is interest that
matters; not its direction.5
∙ These irrational ties may be explained by Benedict Anderson’s imagined
communities theory. In other words, the Turks in France associate
themselves with the other individuals comprising their community (even if
they do not know all of them personally) and strongly applaud the success
and victory of other Turks in a setting of competition with the majority,
brought about by being in the minority.
Until recently Turkey, the motherland, had irrational ties with the Turks in Europe.
For years, every administration tried to prevent European Turks from acquiring
citizenship of the countries they were living, and even born, in. They feared that by
acquiring a different nationality, European Turks would detach from ‘Turkishness’
and Turkey. Legal attachment to the motherland seemed more important than
emotional and identical loyalty. This was partly inﬂuenced by Germany’s denial of
dual-citizenship status. It should be remembered that the nationalist mind-set con-
siders national identity to be one and singular. As Max Weber suggests, nationalism
is a system of one belief over all, and just as a person may be loyal to only one religion
among monotheistic faiths, so must an individual choose to be loyal to only one
nation. Multiple national loyalty is severely condemned. Nevertheless, a recent
radical change occurred in Turkey’s approach to the issue: since the late 1990s, but
particularly after 2002, European Turks are expected to acquire the citizenship of
their country of residence. This will give them a voice in the national and local politics
of their respective countries, and allow them to lobby in favour of Turkey.
The emigration of Turks to Western Europe starting with the 1960s did help to
expand the concept of external Turks. With the settlement of migrant workers from
the mid-1970s onwards, a group of immigrants, scorned by the elite yet cherished for
their accumulation and capital transfer, emerged as the backbone of ‘external Turks’.
After 20 years of neglect, this group was framed within the ‘omnipresent fatherly
State’ in the wake of the 1980 junta. One purpose of this framing was to prevent them
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from ‘taking the wrong path’. The wrong path, of course, was paved with leftist
movements and dissenting religious organisations.
The real danger was assimilation, ‘forgetting’ Turkishness and losing loyalty to
Turkey. So while this group was exposed to Turkish propaganda by print, media and
imams and teachers commissioned from Turkey, they were prevented from entering
into any kind of multiple loyalty. As a knee-jerk reaction by nation-states whose
strength is dubious, the perpetual ﬁrst generation strategy was imposed upon
generations born in Europe. The objective was to ensure that ethnic Turks born in
Europe were at least as loyal to the country as those who came from Turkey, and the
strategy was adopted and implemented by European Turks. The rejection of multiple
loyalty applied to the change in legal afﬁliation – acquiring citizenship of the country
of residence.
For decades, administrations in Turkey considered change in citizenship or an
additional citizenship dangerous. Turks who acquired the citizenship of their country of
residence would make compromises from Turkishness, and their loyalty would weaken.
So they were expected to remain only Turkish. This policy has however changed since
the 2000s. The relief brought by globalisation led Turkish ofﬁcials to believe that
European Turks were no longer under threat of assimilation, to decide that these
communities would lobby for European relations, and to encourage them to acquire the
citizenship of their countries of residence. Nevertheless, these groups are still viewed as
social mechanisms that are at the disposal of the Republic of Turkey.
From another angle, these people are being called upon as soldiers: 10 years ago,
their duty required them to be Turkish citizens; now, they are instructed to become
French or German citizens. Wealth accumulation by migrant workers is still seen as a
remedy for economic distress; the sentimental discourse around homesickness,
loyalty and the motherland is still maintained – to the extent of sheer emotional
exploitation as seen in the most recent Paris rally. The idea is that migrant workers
are the soldiers (envoys) of Turkey: all of these make it clear that the motherland’s
view of the migrant communities has not changed radically.
The improvement and expansion of communication technologies removes the
threat of assimilation that came with the changes to French or German citizenship.
Although multiple legal afﬁliation has become acceptable, this is not the case in
cultural loyalties. Multiple cultural loyalties are still viewed as dangerous and even
treasonous.
As noted earlier, cultural loyalty was built on two pillars: language and religion.
When in the minority, teaching the language to new generations becomes particularly
difﬁcult. Naturally, the language of the majority immediately becomes the dominant
language in a social environment. Furthermore, France insists on ﬂuency in French
as a prerequisite to integration in the country, and this has come to be accepted by the
majority as well as the minority, who initially resisted the idea. Fluency in French is
the most important measure of good integration. As a result, lack of ﬂuency in
Turkish no longer poses a threat to loyalty to ‘Turkishness’.
Meanwhile, religious loyalty, being based on the sacred and therefore immune to
intervention, gained great importance and took priority. In a contradictory way, this
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type of loyalty became an indispensable and paramount element of ‘Turkishness’, for
both Sunni and Alevi Turks in France. However, ﬁlling the gap left by language with
religion gave rise to a number of issues in the French case: the French system is
constructed on the principle of laicism and Turkish immigrants have diverse cultural
and social backgrounds.
Legitimacy and Market Strategies
Ofﬁcial Islam/Dissident Islam
The aversion of Turkish associations to unite under one roof is due to the presence of
a dissenting Islamic movement that is in conﬂict with the ofﬁcial Islam in Turkey. An
in-depth analysis of the division reveals that the rift is not as wide or severe as it seems
or is commonly believed to be.
Dissident Islamic movements opposed to the ofﬁcial Islam have existed through-
out the Ottoman Empire and were carried over to the Republic of Turkey. Both
movements, eager to dictate and control religious thoughts and practices, considered
those who reject whatever is imposed as subversive elements threatening unity and
security, and branded them as heretics. Dissenting Islamic movements resisted
annihilation when the Jacobin Kemalist regime saw them as a threat against the
newly-founded secular regime, and their resistance brought them strength. People of
the Anatolian Islamic culture, followers of heterodox faiths and practices in various
congregations and even some Suﬁs were devastated when their religious orders,
lodges or holy tombs where they congregated were banned and closed. However,
contrary to the wishes of the state, the banning of religious orders did not diminish
their importance, particularly in rural areas. They continued their existence in hiding.
The state began to rein in the religion with the Ofﬁce of Religious Affairs established
in lieu of the abolished Caliphate. Religious orders that fell outside the planned
ofﬁcial religious project were classiﬁed as dissident Islam, even though some were not
even remotely tied to politics. These orders remained hidden until the 1950s, when the
Democrat Party came to power with the votes of the rural population, and then began
to take part in politics as conservative Islam was then viewed favourably. The orders
joined a variety of political movements until the mid-1960s, but ‘political Islam’ was
not yet developed. The foundation of political Islam is the relatively liberal
environment created in the wake of the military coup of 1960. Millî Görüş completed
its association in the 1970s and became one of the leading political parties in Turkey.
To eliminate any previous misconceptions, it must be noted that the ‘dissidence’ of
this party is ﬁrst and foremost political, and not tied to religion. To the contrary,Millî
Görüş holds the belief that Islam already has a very special place in the private and
social lives of the people or Turkey; it is only missing in the political arena. The
purpose is not to discuss religion and draw a roadmap; it is to introduce religion in the
world of politics. In this political environment, Millî Görüş managed to stay away
from radical Islamic movements despite incorporating smaller fundamental groups.
As explained above, despite the fact that the armed forces and other groups of the
society did not acknowledge its legitimacy, the Millî Görüş movement became an
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indispensable part of politics, or the ‘system’, starting with the 1970s. Kemalist circles
were unable to prevent the political parties stemming from theMillî Görüşmovement
from entering coalitions and ﬁnally becoming the ruling party in 2002. Although the
Justice and Development Party argues that it is separate from the movement, the
leaders of the party are all from the Millî Görüş movement, and their constituency is
composed of voters loyal to the same movement.
For these reasons, it is difﬁcult to differentiate between ofﬁcial Islam and dissident
Islam. In the European case, such a difference has lost its raison d’être.
Considering Islam as a system of belief that shapes all aspects (personal and social)
of an individual’s life, dissident Islam may be said to be composed of individuals who
desire a greater weight of religion in social life. From this perspective, it becomes
easier to understand why the people of Turkish origin in Europe place so much
importance on religion. First and foremost, their inadequacy in the other loyalty
measures of ‘Turkishness’ causes religion to gain more importance within these
communities. The prioritisation of religion is a phenomenon that is observable in all
minority groups, and even constitutes one of the minority theories in sociology today:
minorities value religion more than their compatriots who are in the majority in
another country; or, non-religious practices are accepted with more ease if the com-
munity in question is in the majority.
There are two further advantages to being a supporter of the widespread Millî Görüş
movement in Europe. Sidingwith thismovement is not limited to supporting an ideology
that plays a signiﬁcant part in Turkish domestic politics. As the importance of Millî
Görüş rises in Turkey, the proponents of the party in France become even more legiti-
mate and gain a surer foothold within theMuslim community. In other words, members
of Millî Görüş organisations in France are not there because they are interested in
Turkish domestic politics; they are there to rise to a better social status in France.
Nationalising Religion: An Attitude Unique to Nation-States
Important changes have occurred in the attitude of the French state towards laicism
and the perception of the French people of secularism recently. Manifest both in
discourse and in legislation, these changes are connected to the presence of Muslims
in France and their quest for legitimacy. This situation has both a direct and an
indirect connection to the Muslims in France. The ﬁrst is a structural connection.
Four to ﬁve million Muslims may have acquired French citizenship, but have not
achieved legitimacy in the eyes of the French society yet. These ‘new’ French want
their presence to be accepted, both individually and as a religious community with
special rights. The quest for legitimacy causes tension in French society from various
perspectives. On the one hand, the French government has been trying, for more than
15 years, to establish an authority that will represent the Muslims of France in an
attempt to create a French Islam. On the other hand, the public is not in favour of
such an authority, with the idea that it will create separate communities in society.
Speaking of the contextual reasons for the change in the French system of laicism,
the dark image of Islam in Western societies after the 1990s, particularly in the
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aftermath of 9/11, must be investigated. Spreading fear as a symbol of threat, and
even leading to Muslims being viewed as enemies, this new image had repercussions
throughout French society. Although the French are not too keen on the ‘clash of
civilisations’, a large number of people want the Muslims in France to undergo the
laic system of adapting to society, effectively bringing religion under state control.
As part of the same approach, French society wants imams to be raised in French
culture and to address their congregations in French in order to keep abreast of
religious thought taking root on French soil. From this perspective, it can be argued
that the French system of secularism, having clearly separated the state from the
church in its time, is now seeking to overcome issues brought by Muslims – a new
element in society. Similar to Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s, the idea that the state
should keep religion under strict control is gaining acceptance.
This is a process of localising Islam in France. After the oppression of the foreign
and heretic French Protestantism, the nationalisation of French Catholicism with the
law of 1905, and the absorption of Judaism, which had been accused of dual loyalty
for many years, now is the time to nationalise and localise Islam. The objective is to
replace Islam in France with a uniquely French Islam. The hottest debate surrounds
the imams, and the leading issue on the agenda today is the education and training of
imams who will work in France. There are three groups of imams working in French
mosques. One group consists of imams sent fromMuslim countries. This is the group
that is the least accepted by the French society. Imams who serve the people of
Turkish origin in France are appointed by DİTİB, or in other words the Ofﬁce of
Religious Affairs, which reports – and has reported – directly to the Prime Minister
since 1983. These imams work within Turkish organisations in France and their
wages are paid by the government of Turkey through the ‘social affairs attaches’
working in consulates. It is not difﬁcult to understand why these organisations
request imams from Turkey: on the one hand, they are received as representatives of
true ‘Turkishness’ that the ethnic Turks in France have lost over time, while their
afﬁliation with the state of Turkey serves to conﬁrm their allegiance to the
ofﬁcial religion of Turkey. All this and more is available for free. These organisations
are far from being rich, so not having to pay the wages of the imam comes
as a great relief. In fact, the ﬁnances of some organisations are so precarious that they
choose to assign their properties to the Ofﬁce of Religious Affairs to
ensure that imams are sent on a regular basis and building maintenance is paid for by
the Ofﬁce.
Despite the negative reaction by the public, French authorities do not object to the
imams sent from Turkey because they are under the supervision of the Turkish state,
and present less of a threat than local imams who are not controlled by any country.
As long as there is no institution to provide education to local imams in France, it is
important that foreign imams are under the supervision of the country they come
from. If the country is secular like Turkey, this procedure becomes even more
important. The foremost criticism of imams is that they do not speak French. Taking
this criticism into consideration, the Ofﬁce of Religious Affairs started a new proce-
dure in 2005: about a hundred young individuals are chosen from the countries of
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immigration (France, Germany, the Netherlands, etc), travel to Ankara to receive
religious education, and are sent back to their countries. In this respect, it must also be
mentioned that the Ofﬁce of Religious Affairs is not disturbed by imams being
educated in Europe. The Ofﬁce of Religious Affairs supports education abroad on
one condition: contributing to the education so that the Ofﬁce can continue to keep
imams serving in Turkish mosques under its supervision.
As minorities, all religions take on two contradicting aspects. On the one hand,
they resist changes that would have been readily adopted had they been in the
majority, while trying to adapt to the country, if begrudgingly, on the other. This
contradiction can be observed in the Turkish community in France. Meanwhile,
because religious loyalty refers to national loyalty, individuals adopt a religious
attitude in an attempt to prove their loyalty to the community and nation to which
they belong.6 This stance seeks to promote rational explanations for religious beha-
viours (such as claiming that pork is bad for health), and argues that religion has a
very important place within the community because it constitutes a critical element of
everyday life. By becoming an institution, the community manifests its existence in
the eyes of the majority, and reafﬁrms the fact that it will continue to exist throughout
time and place. As an example, while the Turkish community had kept its distance
from the Muslims Council of France and the local councils in the beginning, it has
since become a part of these organisations for strategic purposes.
Conclusion
Although more than 50 years have passed since the ﬁrst emigration of Turks to
France, terms such as ‘French Turks’ or ‘half French-half Turk’ are still problematic
today. The obstacles to overcome have structural and contextual elements. In
Turkey, as well as in France, ‘multiculturalism’ is asserted on the surface. The truth,
however, is different: both states are founded on national unity above all. In other
words, both states, drawing on their experience of nation-building, prefer that their
citizens belong to one and only one nation. National loyalty and the resulting notion
of nationalism sharply rejects the idea of multiple loyalties. Therefore, the French are
unable to associate the immigrant communities with their idea of a Nation, even
when they have acquired French citizenship or even were born in France. There is a
great difference between Turks and North Africans at this point. The struggle of the
North Africans was to be accepted as ‘French’ and to gain legitimacy as French,
whereas people from Turkey ﬁght to have their Turkish or Kurdish presence in
France recognised and made legitimate. Between 2006 and 2008, I had the oppor-
tunity to ask a number of questions to 200 Turkish students taking their bacca-
laureate exams. A large majority of them were born in France (98%) and were French
citizens (91%). Furthermore, 22% had a parent who was born in France. Despite this,
none of them answered the question ‘Where are you from?’ with the name of the city
they were born or living in.Without a single exception, all answered with the province
in Turkey where their parents or at least the head of family (in most cases, the
paternal grandfather) came from. This did not change even if those individuals had
414 Samim Akgönül
no familial or physical ties to these provinces, had never even been there, and had a
poor command of Turkish. Based on these responses, we can conﬁdently claim that
neither the majority nor the Turkish minority have internalised the concept of mul-
tiple loyalties. This serves to prove that having dual citizenship is not an indication of
feeling emotional ties to both nations.
Such structural data should be accompanied by a contextual explanation on the
‘perpetual ﬁrst generation’ strategy. The intentional or unintentional practice of this
strategy (marriage of people born and raised in France to spouses born and raised in
Turkey) enables the Turks in France and across Europe to remain in close ties with
Turkey, the Turkish language, and the religion. Generations born in France do lose
their command of Turkish, but this shortcoming is compensated for by religion,
customs, loyalty to the ‘motherland’ and the cultural assimilation of parents who had
recently emigrated from Turkey. In other words, multiple loyalty is experienced but
not expressed, and is even rejected.
Minority theory may explain the situation: all minorities create rules for socialising
that prevent their members from becoming individuals. Even if a member of the
minority gains the freedom to deﬁne himself as an individual, he will continue to be
perceived and treated as a member of a minority by the majority and the minority
alike. Weber’s theory of methodological individualism cannot be used for minorities
where the unity and integrity of the identity is paramount. But the antithesis,
Durkheim’s holism, is inadequate as far as the socialising system is considered.
Among theories that will answer this paradigm is the methodological complex
individualism conceptualised by Jean Pierre Dupuy.7 This appears to be the best way
to break the rigid barriers of the individual/minority/majority triangle. I believe that it
is not entirely adequate to focus solely on multiple loyalties8 in a situation where the
minority is still not legitimate in the eyes of the majority and is seen as an outside
element. To religious minorities that are yet to become legitimate in society,
the demand of the majority for them to adapt their religious customs and practices
to the new context in which they settle may be regarded as oppression: by submitting
to the demand, they may withdraw from their culture. Religion – or religious
practices – like all other aspects of a cultural whole, even if it is not accepted by the
members of the minority for the purpose of preserving their uniqueness, is expected to
adapt to the new circumstances and surroundings. It cannot be denied that the reli-
gious attitudes and overall approach of the people of Turkey in France changed as a
result of this interaction. On the other hand, because the same group is also in danger
of alienation from their cultures and assimilation, these developments win the favour
of neither the Turkish society nor the minority itself. Returning to Turkey, the people
in France are confronted with changes in their behaviour as if it was a crime.
The worst insult to Turks coming from France is to tell them they have become
French. Owing to the phenomenon of interaction, a member of this community very
naturally brings together and uses religious symbols that belong to the Turks in
Turkey with those belonging to the majority in France. Collective behaviour is
shaping the behaviour of the individual, and individual discourses are creating the
collective behaviour.9
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